This article explores the evolution of the imperial Crown, particularly in respect of the right to advise, and the development of the divisible Crown. The position in New Zealand is compared and contrasted with that in other countries, particularly Canada and Australia. It will be shown that the devolution of the Crown was the principal avenue through which independence was conferred upon the Dominions. Independence is fundamentally a political fact rather than purely a matter of legal rights.
Introduction
In the absence of a widespread political and legal consensus about the sources of legislative authority, the traditional Diceyan view of parliamentary sovereignty 1 perhaps fails to adequately explain the political reality of New Zealand's undoubted political independence. A better explanation may be that the Crown, rather than Parliament, and in conjunction with the Treaty of Waitangi, is the source of an autochthonous constitutional order. This is grounded in symbolism and administrative practice, rather than technical rules of sovereignty or authority.
Indeed, it was the flexible application of common law principles concerned with the prerogatives of the Crown, and the operation of constitutional conventions relating to responsible government, rather than the establishment of legislatures per se, that led to the development of independent states from colonies. 2 Practical executive or political independence came before formal legislative and judicial independence. 3 This general observation is as true for New Zealand as it is for the other 'old Dominions'. Legal changes tended to follow political changes, and this is seen especially in the considerable distortion which arose between the powers conferred upon the Governor-General by the letters patent constituting the office, and the powers actually exercised. The latter is arguably still not achieved, with New Zealand's final court of appeal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
Imperial constitutional law was developed not in the courts so much as in the opinions of the law officers of the Crown. It was the practice that evolved out of these opinions which eventually influenced the courts. They followed, but did not invent, doctrines such as that of colonial legislative territoriality. 4 As a consequence of this process, constitutional writers tended to become distracted by abstract concepts such as the unity of the Crown. 5 This was responsible for what Zines called 'decades of distorted reasoning, intellectual gymnastics and a blindness to reality '. 6 This article explores the evolution of the imperial Crown, particularly in respect of the right to advise, and the development of the divisible Crown. The position in New Zealand is compared and contrasted with that in other countries, particularly Canada and Australia. It will be shown that the devolution of the Crown was the principal avenue through which independence was conferred upon the Dominions. Independence is fundamentally a political fact rather than purely a matter of legal rights.
More importantly, as part of this process the constitutional grundnorm appears to have changed. 7 Whereas legislative theory is hindered by continued adherence to concepts of Diceyan parliamentary supremacy, the evolution of the Crown provides an explanation for the political and legal reality of independence.
The first section of this article examines the devolution of the right to advise the Crown. This saw the transfer of political control of the royal prerogative from imperial to dominion Ministers. While the Sovereign was the source of certain prerogative powers the right to formally advise the Sovereign remained important. As a colony, some responsibilities remained in the hands of imperial Ministers. But with the growth of independence more authority was assumed by the Crown acting on the advice of local Ministers.
Whilst the devolution of this responsibility did not of itself confer legal independence upon New Zealand, it did more than merely mirror political independence already conferred. For the Crown acted as the channel or conduit Evatt, above n 2, ch 1-3. 7
In Kelsen's philosophy of law, a grundnorm is the basic, fundamental postulate, which justifies all principles and rules of the legal system and to which all inferior rules of the system may be deduced; Michael Hayback, 'Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen in the crisis of Democracy between World Wars I and II' (1990) Universitaet Salzburg DrIur thesis.
through which independence was acquired. This process was encouraged by the physical absence of the Sovereign, which had resulted in the theory that the Sovereign's prerogative existed throughout the empire, though they might b e absent from a given territory.
The second section considers the evolution of the divisible Crown. The concept of the divisible Crown has come to mean that although the one person is Sovereign of more than one country, they hold legally distinct positions. Historically, the monarch was regarded as being Sovereign of each Dominion because he or she was the Sovereign of the United Kingdom. Now it would appear, at least for some realms, that this contingent relationship no longer exists. The existence of separate legal titles has led to an emphasis upon national identity, as has been seen in the evolution of the oath of allegiance.
This article explores two distinct aspects of the evolving independence of New Zealand. It will be shown that, unlike concepts of legislative sovereignty, the continuity and evolution of the Crown has led to a widespread acceptance and understanding of independence.
The Right to Advise
The executive prerogatives of the Crown include the appointment of Ministers, and those powers which derive from the Sovereign's position as head of the armed forces and of the civil service. The bestowal of honours and incorporation by royal charter 8 are further examples. The Sovereign's authority as the sole legal representative of the country is particularly important in relation to foreign relations. 9 In cases of national emergency the Crown is responsible for the defence of the realm, and is the only judge of the existence of danger from external enemies. 10 But the monarch in English law and t radition was never thought of as being absolute. 11 As Bracton said, the king ruled 'under God and the law'. 12 The 13 By this he meant that the king of England made laws only by the consent of his people, and not merely on his own authority.
Later the increasing sophistication of government led to a greater burden on Ministers, and their increasing independence from the Sovereign and responsibility to Parliament. Over time Ministers acquired control of the actions of the Crown. It was generally agreed after 1815 that the Sovereign should be kept out of party politics. 14 Over the course of the nineteenth century the monarchy moved from sharing government, to having a share in government, to a largely advisory role. In the later years of the reign of Victoria the growing importance of organised political parties gave her less room to manoeuvre than her predecessors. 15 But monarchy concentrates legal authority and power in one person, even where symbolic concentration alone remains. 16 This was the logic underpinning the belief in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the unity of the Crown. The imperial Crown was one and indivisible. 'The colonies formed one realm with the United Kingdom', the whole being under the sovereignty of the Crown. 17 This sovereignty was exercised on the advice of imperial Ministers.
In his seminal work on the royal prerogative, Herbert Evatt showed how this unity of the Crown was the very means through which separateness of the Dominions was achieved. The indivisibility of the Crown meant the existence of royal prerogatives throughout the empire. The identity of those who could give formal advice to the Crown changed from imperial to Dominion Ministers-and little or no formal legal changes were needed for states to change from being colonies to being fully independent. 18 13 Sir John Fortescue, The Governance of England (1979 By 1919 most of the powers of the Crown abroad were exercised on the advice of local ministries in all the Dominions and self-governing colonies. 19 That this was not yet a complete transference can be seen by the argument of the New Zealand Prime Minister, the Rt Hon William Massey, at the Imperial Conference of 1921. He maintained the principle that 'when the King, the Head of State, declares war the whole of his subjects are at war'. 20 Dominions might sign commercial treaties, but not those concluding a war. Some external affairs were still a matter for the imperial authorities.
The right to advise the Crown in the exercise of the war prerogative was kept in the hands of British Ministers, and the right to advise the Crown excluded imperial concerns such as nationality, shipping, and defence. 21 This was to change however, as the Dominions had been given membership of the League of Nations after the First World War, and came to be regarded in international law as independent countries. In the aftermath of that war, in which the colonies played a significant role, there was an expectation that the major colonies would gain benefits commensurate with their size and importance. The emphasis on nationstates during the redrawing of Europe also served to promote this. former, the Dominion governments the latter. 23 Arthur Berridale Keith thought however that the suggestion that the King can act directly on the advice of Dominion Ministers is a constitutional monstrosity, which would be fatal to the security of the position of the Crown. 24 However, the Irish government thought there was now only a personal union of the Crown. 25 If this were so, then imperial Ministers could have no role in advising the king with respect to any matter internal to a Dominion. The Irish may not have reflected the majority view, but theirs made much more logical sense than that, for example, of Hughes.
Once the principle was established that the Dominions were equal with the United Kingdom, it was inevitable that the Dominions should acquire the exclusive right to advise the Crown. This was to be gained in the course of the 1920s and 1930s, and finally settled in the 1940s. As a logical consequence of the doctrine of equality, this was the only possible outcome.
It was the Second World War which finally settled the question of whether there was a complete transfer to Dominion Ministers of the right to advise the Crown, and therefore complete executive or political independence. This may be seen by comparing the practice of the New Zealand government with that of Australia, and the other Dominions.
At the outbreak of the war, the Australian Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Robert Menzies, adhered to the idea that the king was at once at war in respect of the whole empire. Therefore, the only formal steps taken by Australia were publishing a notice in the Commonwealth Gazette recording the fact that war had broken out between the United Kingdom and Germany, and requesting the British government to inform the German government that Australia was associated in the war with Germany. 26 The limited intention of these actions is quite clear from the words used in the notice recording the fact that war had broken out: 'It is Canada and South Africa, however, chose to make separate proclamations of war. Both were able to do so because in those Dominions there had clearly been a delegation by the king to the Governor-General of the prerogative to declare war and make peace. 28 Ireland, now a republic in all but name, chose to remain neutral, the clearest manifestation of political independence.
But by 1941 the official view in Australia had changed, it would seem largely because of the influence of Herbert Evatt as Minister of External Affairs. 29 War was declared against Finland, Hungary and Roumania without waiting for the United Kingdom to act. 30 Because there was no existing mechanism through which the king could declare Australia to be at war, an arrangement was made in 1941 by which the king was advised by telegram, and countersignature by Australian Ministers occurred when the resulting document was received in Canberra some weeks later. 31 When war was declared against Japan, the Prime Minister instructed the High Commissioner in London to place the advice of the king's Ministers in Australia before His Majesty. The resulting proclamation was then published in the Commonwealth Gazette. 32 The view in Australia was coloured by doubts as to the delegation of the prerogative to declare war, and a lingering belief that 'Britain is at war therefore Australia is at war'. New Zealand took a more pragmatic approach. The New Zealand government chose to join the war alongside the United Kingdom 'and the other members of the British Commonwealth who have taken up the sword with us'. 41 The king could now potentially be at war with an enemy in respect of one Dominion, and at the same time maintaining peaceful relations with the same country, as king of another Dominion. Nor need New Zealand necessarily commence hostilities against a common enemy at the same time as the United Kingdom, a fact which was presaged in 1941: 42 His Excellency the Governor-General has it in command from His Majesty the King to declare that a state of war exists between His Majesty and the Emperor of Japan, and that such a state of war has existed, in respect of New Zealand, from 11 am, New Zealand Summertime, on the 8th day of December, 1941.
The war prerogative, perhaps the most solemn of the powers of the Crown, had now been divided. New Zealand did not regard itself as legally bound by a decision of United Kingdom Ministers, but chose to follow their political lead. Thereafter there remained few if any aspects of the prerogative upon which the Sovereign acted upon the advice of British Ministers in respect of New Zealand. The right to advise the Sovereign was used as a means of acquiring and manifesting national independence.
Whereas in Australia the telegram was used as a means of advising the Crown, in New Zealand Ministers simply advised the Governor-General to exercise a prerogative formerly exercised only by the king on the advice of British Ministers. The king's signature was not required, though his prior approval was of course obtained.
Thus, at a time when the legislative independence of New Zealand was still uncertain, its executive, or political independence had been achieved by the division of the royal prerogative. This prerogative, in coming within the exclusive control of New Zealand Ministers, allowed them to exercise the full range of executive powers which the Crown in the United Kingdom enjoyed.
The existence, and division, of the royal prerogative, did not of itself give independence to New Zealand. But it was a principal means by which this independence was established and affirmed. Lacking a distinct independence date, New Zealand, like Canada, Australia and South Africa, owed its independence to a gradual process whose origins lay in the earliest years of British imperial history.
According to orthodox imperial constitutional law, British settlers enjoyed as part of the law of England all their public rights as subjects of the Crown. 43 prerogative of the Crown towards them was therefore limited. The corollary of this was that migration left these subjects still under the protection of the Crown and entitled to all the legal safeguards which secured the liberties of natural-born subjects.
Foremost among these was the right to a legislative assembly analogous to the imperial Parliament. 44 But the right to executive independence was not far behind. By the mid-eighteenth century the local assemblies in chartered colonies elected the governor, enacted laws repugnant to English law, declined to recognise Admiralty jurisdiction or appeal rights, n eglected to provide their quotas for imperial defence, and encouraged trades forbidden by imperial legislation. 45 In short, they were politically independent. What was reluctantly conceded to the American colonies was freely conferred upon the later empire, without violence and therefore without a break in legal continuity.
But if the prerogative could be divided, could the Crown also be divided? For the existence of a divisible prerogative meant that no longer was the Crown exclusively British. It had become imperial to the extent that it was no longer the exclusive responsibility of the British government. 46
The Divisible Crown
Not merely had the right to advise the Crown passed from the imperial government to the Dominions, but in the course of the twentieth century the Crown itself has been said to have become 'separate and divisible'. 47 The single Sovereign has now apparently come to be Sovereign severally over separate and different realms, despite the element of unity and continuity still reflected i n the royal styles. There is a personal union of several Crowns, each in right of a particular realm, but each, apparently, with the same law of succession. 48 This has both reflected the increasing perceptions of national identity, and (in part at least), aided in the expression of that identity.
The means by which the old unitary Crown with a common allegiance owed throughout the empire has come to be a plurality of Crowns is however something The exact status of the succession remains unclear, but it is probable that, were the matter to be litigated, an Australian court would today hold that the federal Parliament is empowered to alter the succession law. 54 Other countries have preserved legal forms which appear to presuppose that they share not only the person of the Sovereign with another country, but also, in some respects, the same legal institution. 55 Yet s 9 may also be taken to not necessarily limit the sovereignty to that of the United Kingdom, were a division to be sought.
Even in more recently independent states it could be argued that unity of the Crown may still be presumed. As a matter of statutory interpretation, references to 'Her Majesty' can be taken to mean Her Majesty in right of the country concerned, which suggests more than merely a personal union of countries. For example, the Belize Act 1981 (UK), the schedule of which contains the Constitution of Belize, simply provides that: ' The executive authority of Belize is vested in HM'. 56 'Her Majesty' is nowhere defined in the Constitution, but, as it is enacted in a British Act of Parliament, the identity of 'HM' would appear to be the Sovereign of the United Kingdom. These legal formulas reflect a common belief that the Crown, though separate in each realm, shares some common attributes, and that it is not merely chance which sees the one person Sovereign of a score of countries.
The Universality of the Sovereignty
Belief in the universality of the sovereignty of the Crown is, of course, the traditional view of the empire. In the late nineteenth century Story J said that '[for] the purpose of entitling itself to the benefit of its prerogative rights, the Crown is to be considered as one and indivisible throughout the empire'. 59 An early twentieth century Canadian writer said that 'the Crown is to be considered as one and indivisible throughout the empire, and cannot be severed into as many distinct kingships as there are Dominions and self-governing Colonies'. 60 In Theodore v Duncan 61 Viscount Haldane observed that 'the Crown is one and indivisible'.
Corbett, writing just after the beginning of the twentieth century, 62 thought that a distinction could and should be drawn between the king as representing one body politic, and the king as representing another. The weight of tradition was to prove too strong however to enable this idea to take hold at that time. 63 57 s 82(1 Within thirty years of the Canadian confederation, the unitary Crown and its prerogatives had fractured and become territorially dispersed. The Privy Council had found land in each province to be vested in the provincial Crown, 66 and it had allowed provincial legislatures to assume such privileges as they deemed necessary. 67 Finally, it had pronounced a provincial status equal to that of the central authority, within the Canadian confederation. 68 The operation of the Crown in the Canadian provinces reinforced the dispersion inherent i n the federal principle. 69 The major conflict in the post-Confederation years between the provincial and federal governments turned on the status of the provinces in the federation. The evolution of provincial autonomy was not caused by the existence of the Crown, but the Crown was the means through which it was achieved. Thus it reflected autonomy which stemmed from independent historical, economic and cultural factors. But the existence of the Crown meant that each provincial government could claim, and did so successfully, that it was imbued with some of the authority of the Crown.
Within the empire as a whole parallel developments were t aking place. The advent of the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK) removed, for Dominions, the colonial limitations of legislative repugnancy and constitutional incapacity. But this did not itself amount to political independence. This had been established at the 1926 and 1930 Imperial Conferences, with the adoption of the principle that 'the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations', and that 'they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown'. 73 The Balfour formula, given statutory form in the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK), prescribed allegiance to the Crown as one of the conditions then obtaining for membership in the British Commonwealth. But as the Dominions individually entered the international arena, 74 that common allegiance implied less the unity of the Crown than its opposite, divisibility. 75 But, whilst the right to advise the Crown was accorded the Dominions, there was still some uncertainty as to the true identity of the Crown. As late as the royal visit to Canada in 1939, the Dominions Office rejected the theory of divisibility:
It is by virtue of his succession as 'King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas ..' that he is King in all parts of his Dominions. In this sense he is King in Canada in precisely the same manner in which he is King in the United Kingdom ... It is one kingship, but the King is in a position to act independently in respect of each or any part of his Dominions. 76 But most of the leaders of the Commonwealth in the late 1940s believed that the Balfour formula should not be allowed to put the Commonwealth within a formal strait-jacket. To accommodate India within the new-style Commonwealth, the title of 'Head of the Commonwealth' was adopted in the London Declaration at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting of April 1949. In future membership was to be based not on allegiance but on a declared act of will. 77 As the Crown played the surrogate role of State in the stateless society, so it came to assume a unique role in the empire as well. Keith's aphorism that 'the Crown has always been imperial' had a constitutional significance that only gradually became manifest. 78 Once the distinction was accepted that the Crown could act in right of another realm, then it was only a matter of time before the division overcame the links between the realms.
The Division of the Sovereignty
The 1936 abdication of King Edward VIII strengthened the arguments for the divisibility of the Crown 79 and, indeed, proved its validity. Each realm approached the problem of the abdication differently. Some sought to use the opportunity afforded to make manifest their own national identity in a symbolic way, by showing that the choice of Sovereign was theirs alone, and not dependent upon the United Kingdom. Others adopted more traditional approaches. But the trend was set by the former countries (those which sought to use the opportunity to emphasise their own national identity), led by South Africa and Ireland.
The It was assumed by the British government that since the royal title was parliamentary, it could only be altered by statute. 82 However the South African government took the view that the instrument of abdication signed by the former king took effect proprio vigore 83 for all Commonwealth countries when signed by the king.
Subsequent South African legislation therefore served only the purpose of providing for the consequences of the abdication for the former king and possible heirs of his body. However it is doubtful that the South African view of the matter was correct. 84 Even if the king's own act was intended to cause an effective demise of the Crown-85 and it is clear from the wording of the Instrument of Abdication that the late king did not assume any such power-86 it does not follow that that instrument alone would be effective in law to alter a statutory succession. This approach conflicted with the developing doctrine of divisibility. Specific South African legislation was politically desirable, to make it clear that it was the Instrument of Abdication which resulted in a change of Sovereign of South Africa. It would be unacceptable to the nationalist party for the new Sovereign to owe his position to being either the next of 'His Majesty's heirs and successors in the sovereignty of the United Kingdom', 87 or to a formal request and consent from the United Kingdom.
In terms of the
As the dates of the British and South African Acts differed, for a day the Crown was divided, with Edward VIII reigning one day less in South Africa than elsewhere in the empire. In New Zealand consent was by executive action only. However, motions to ratify and confirm the assent given by New Zealand Ministers to the imperial Act were recorded in both Houses of the General Assembly. 90 Like Australia, there was no consideration given to passing local legislation, as it was believed that consent to British legislation was legally and politically sufficient. Unlike in Ireland and South Africa, national sentiment in New Zealand were not averse to the new king owing his title, at least in part, to an Act of the imperial Parliament.
After 1936 there were few overt moves to challenge or question the growing concept of the divisible Crown. The lead taken by South Africa and Ireland showed that relatively minor and technical rules could have significant symbolic importance. But the evolution of the concept of the divisible Crown remained It is submitted however that the authority upon which this conclusion was based was inappropriate. The question of separate Crowns was considered in the Spycatcher cases in relation to the legal relationship between the United Kingdom and Hanover, 93 and England and Scotland, 94 which do not constitute good analogies. The Crown is also divisible within the Australian and Canadian federations, 95 but this observation of course risks confusion between jurisdiction and sovereignty. 96 As Re Ashman and Best 97 established, these distinctions can have important consequences. 98 However, where a constitutional formula which can confer rights is provided, it is only a matter of time before those r ights are claimed. If the Crown could be advised by local Ministries, then the Crown was likely to become diffused. The reason for the establishment of divisible Crowns lies not so much in legal formula, but in a changing political paradigm.
As can be seen in the above comparisons between South Africa and Ireland on the one hand, and New Zealand, Canada, and Australia on the other, the concept of a divisible Crown has evolved largely as a consequence of the increasing political independence of the Dominions. Thus South Africa emphasised that the king was Sovereign of South Africa irrespective of his position elsewhere. But it was only in the existence of the office that such a symbolic statement was possible. The United States of America had to create new symbols of national identity after 1776. These already existed in the Dominions, and were to be used increasingly after the 1920s, both symbolically, and practically. 99 The 1936 abdication led to acceptance of the practicalities of this right to advise the Crown. If the Crown could receive different advice in each country, the extent to which it could still be regarded as a single entity was uncertain.
The relevance to New Zealand was that, although to a great extent this country still looked to the Crown as the symbol of imperial unity, that unity was declining, leaving the Crown (or Crowns) to acquire a new role, or become increasingly marginalised. This new role was to include representing New Zealand, and the special relationship between Crown and Maori.
Allegiance to the Sovereign
One way in which the Crown was seen as a symbol of imperial unity was in the single status of subject. In New Zealand nationality was, until the passage of the Citizenship Act 1977 (NZ), governed by the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948 (NZ), which was modelled upon the British Nationality Act 1948 (UK). As in that latter Act, the principle category was British subjects (who might also be called Commonwealth citizens). British subjects were divided into those who were citizens of the independent nations of the Commonwealth, and citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies on the one hand, and those who were New Zealand citizens on the other. British subjects no longer had to owe allegiance to the Crown, as formerly. They were now defined in terms of national status, rather than allegiance.
Under the provisions of the Citizenship Act 1977 (NZ), citizenship is generally acquired by birth. 100 The term Commonwealth citizen survives, having now completely superseded that of British subject. The Bill, introduced into Parliament as the Citizens and Aliens Bill, was intended to consolidate the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948 (NZ), and the Aliens Act 1948 (NZ). Registration of British subjects, and naturalisation of aliens was replaced by grant of citizenship.
The Act recognised the increasing emphasis on individual citizenship in the Commonwealth, but did nothing to:
depart from due recognition of the common code of British subject or Commonwealth subject status. The Bill does, however, also seek to put on a 99 Viz in the delegation of the prerogative, and in the symbolic manifestations of separate titles. 100 All those born in New Zealand after 1 January 1949. more common footing aspirants for New Zealand citizenship who are on the one hand British subjects, and on the other aliens-this term meaning any non-British subjects. 101 The Act provides that persons granted New Zealand citizenship may be required to take the oath of allegiance, unless exempted. 102 It was thought that it was desirable that the oath be taken in all cases, but administrative complications ruled this out as a practical proposition at that time. 103 Zealand nature of the oath, though this can only be inferred as the Bill was not debated in Parliament. 105 From 1 July 1996 those required to take the oath have included those individuals who were subjects of the Queen in another o f her realms, who were formerly exempt from the requirement to take the oath of allegiance in public, and until 1979 completely exempt. 106 The move was said to result from a debate on immigration, and to have been promoted by the United Party. 107 About 3,500 people a year now attend citizenship ceremonies run by local councils. 108 These ceremonies provide an opportunity for new citizens to make a public commitment to their new obligations. 109 Now all people becoming New Zealand citizens, whether or not they were subjects of the Queen overseas, must publicly take the oath of allegiance to the Queen of New Zealand. This has ended another of the remaining symbolic links to an imperial Crown, especially since the oath of allegiance has omitted 'Her Other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith' since 1979, 110 though these remain part of the Queen's official style. 111 The emphasis is clearly on New Zealand, and whatever their origins, new citizens swear allegiance to the Queen of New Zealand. Citizenship and allegiance have once again become closely aligned. In a parallel development, 'subject of the Queen' in s 117 of the Constitution of Australia 1900 is now taken to mean subjects of the Queen of Australia, 112 rather than of the United Kingdom and Dominions overseas. The United Kingdom itself is now a "foreign" power under s 44(i) of the Australian Constitution. 113
Conclusion
As legislative authority might appear to forever rely upon the prior authority of an imperial Parliament, so the authority of the Crown in New Zealand depends upon the authority of the (formerly imperial) Crown. Whereas the former is a technical issue which has concerned few but constitutional lawyers, the latter is central to the country's identity, and has been more widely analysed. Indeed, the concept of the divisible Crown is now generally accepted, 114 and in this concept lies the true political and legal independence of New Zealand.
In the development of legislative independence there was a significant change in authority, but the new powers were evolutionary, inherited powers. With the development of executive independence the change in authority was accompanied by a more potent symbolic and conceptual change. The Crown, rather than being the source of imperial executive authority, became the source of local authority.
The development of the concept of the divisible Crown came about as the Dominions obtained control of the prerogative. One king, several kingdoms gradually became several distinct kingships. This was not as the result of any conscious policy decision, but merely as a result of the natural evolution of domestic laws and practices in the absence of an insistence on uniformity by the imperial authorities. Thus in 1936 South Africa asserted its independence b y insisting that the king owed his title to local rather than imperial law, and asserted this successfully.
The Crown as an imperial institution has become the property of each of the former imperial possessions. Some countries have chosen to adapt that symbolic institution to their own uses, just as the other institutions of Westminster government have been adapted and modified. In each case however, the first step has been the acquisition of control over the executive, and this caused a partial division of the Crown. The expression national Crown might be preferable to separate sovereignty, in that the former allows the person of the Sovereign to continue to be seen as British, but acknowledges that the institution has in some way been nationalised. This was also expressed through the evolution of citizenship, and allegiance to a national Crown, from the status of British subject. To cite Evatt again, 'through the evolution of the Crown little or no formal legal changes were needed for states to change from being colonies to being fully independent'. 115
It was a logical, and probably inevitable step, for the imperial Crown to develop into distinct local Crowns. 116 It followed that in each, though legal continuity might be maintained to an historically prior i mperial enactment or prerogative measure, ultimate authority depended upon local laws and constitutional principles. In that respect, at least, the constitution must be seen as autochthonous. Thus, although theories of parliamentary supremacy might be uncertain, it was accepted by the 1940s that the Sovereign was separately head of State of each realm. This concept had not been legislated for, it represented the acceptance of a new grundnorm, or principle of the constitution, one which more closely matched the political realities.
The Crown, in acting as the tool or mechanism through which New Zealand acquired political independence, also became a principal focus of governmental authority. Without an entrenched Constitution, which in the United States of America and to some extent in Canada and Australia also became an alternative symbolic focus of authority, 117 the Crown continued its traditional function as a constitutional focus. 
